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Acquisitions are standard components of the growth strategies of many organizations. 
Frequently, acquisitions raise important questions concerning how and to what extent 
the acquisition’s information technology (IT) needs to be integrated into the IT of the 
acquirer. We investigate how the initial conditions of business and IT alignment in the 
acquirer and the acquisition affect the complexity of the post-acquisition IT integration 
process, in acquisitions of business units by multi-business organizations. Adopting an 
IT alignment model for multi-business organizations, we explain the complexity of IT 
integration paths in two acquisitions made by the industry group Trelleborg AB. We 
identify four initial business and IT strategic alignment conditions where the IT 
integration process is a simple one-step process exploiting existing business and IT 
capabilities. Low compliance with these conditions leads to increased complexity 
because additional business and/or IT capabilities have to be developed to leverage the 
full potential of the acquisition. 
Keywords:   IT integration, Acquisition, Multi-Business Organizations, Merger, Strategic 
alignment, IT capability.  
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Introduction 
Acquisitions are standard and frequently used corporate strategies. Many organizations, including, for 
example, Cisco and Siemens, have publicly espoused acquisition strategies for capturing economies of 
scale or acquiring growth options. These organizations frequently complete several acquisitions each year.  
When organizations acquire business units, the challenges include the extent of and mechanisms for post-
acquisition business and IT alignment (henceforth in this paper called post-acquisition IT integration). 
The importance of IT integration comes from the fact that many organizations are dependent on IT to 
carry out their business activities. Consequently, post-acquisition, they cannot function effectively until 
the IT of the acquired business unit is integrated into the acquirer‟s IT infrastructure (Evgeniou 2002; 
Mehta and Hirschheim 2007).  
Supporting this critical assumption, Accenture (2006) and McKinsey (Sarrazin and West 2011) report that 
45-60% of the expected benefits from mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are directly dependent on post-
acquisition IT integration. Consistent with these findings, the limited extant IT literature on M&As 
concludes that, in order to realize synergistic benefits, IT integration strategies must be aligned to the 
business acquisition strategies (Giacomazzi et al. 1997; Johnston and Yetton 1996; Mehta and Hirschheim 
2007; Wijnhoven et al. 2006).  
In addition, Rogers (2005) cites factors relating to IT integration as the third most important reason for 
M&A failures. These are frequent. Two thirds of M&As are financial failures, according to Bourgeois and 
Patel (2009). Here, we show that the factors affecting post-acquisition IT integration include the pre-
acquisition business and IT capabilities of both the acquirer and the acquisition. 
The M&A domain is large and complex. In this exploratory study, we restrict the analysis of post-
acquisition IT integration to the acquisition of business units by multi-business organizations. This limits 
the generalizability of the contribution. However, this restricted domain is sufficiently challenging and 
under-researched to justify and motivate this paper and so begin to build a theory of post-acquisition IT 
integration. 
Therefore, the question guiding this exploratory research study is: 
 How do the initial conditions affect the complexity of the post-acquisition IT integration process in 
acquisitions of business units by multi-business organizations? 
Specifically, the research identifies the pre-acquisition business and IT capabilities that influence the 
complexity of the post-acquisition IT integration processes. We show how, contingent on four initial 
conditions, post-acquisition IT integration varies from a simple, one step process, that exploits existing 
business and IT capabilities, to a multi-step, complex process to build new capabilities. 
To do this, we structure the balance of this paper into four sections. The first reviews the literature on 
corporate and SBU business and IT strategies, presenting an analytical framework to examine business 
and IT alignment in multi-business organizations. It then applies this framework to develop a model of 
post-acquisition IT integration and to identify four critical initial conditions. The second presents the 
methodology. The third describes two acquisitions by the same multi-business organization. In the fourth 
section, drawing on the two case studies, we show how post-acquisition IT integration is contingent on 
pre-acquisition business and IT alignment. The implications for theory and practice are discussed.  
Literature review and theory development 
Acquisitions are undertaken for many reasons, including, for example, capturing the business benefits of 
scope or scale. Here, we are interested in the process of integrating business and IT strategies post-
acquisition to achieve those and other benefits. The basic argument is that business and IT strategic 
alignment contributes to organizational performance (See, for example, Byrd et al. 2006; Chan et al. 
2006; Papp 1999), with alignment defined as the formulation and implementation of decisions linking 
business and IT to enable an organization to achieve its objectives (David 2003). Therefore, an acquisition 
that reduces the business and IT strategic alignment would damage organizational value or, at least, fail to 
realize all of the potential IT-based benefits from that acquisition. 
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While the IT-based literature on M&As is limited, the evidence strongly supports the general conclusion 
that IT integration post-acquisition is necessary to capture the anticipated IT-based benefits (Giacomazzi 
et al. 1997; Johnston and Yetton 1996; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007; Wijnhoven et al. 2006). Johnston 
and Yetton analyze this issue at the technical, IT function and organizational levels. Giacomazzi et al. 
identify factors that influence IT integration success and propose a normative model for IT alignment. 
Wijnhoven et al. combine those three categories with four types of integration modes to develop a variant 
on Henderson and Venkatraman‟s (1993) Strategic Alignment Model. Mehta and Hirschheim adopt the IT 
alignment framework of Hirschheim and Sabherwal (2001) to investigate the factors that influence IT 
managers‟ choices of integration solutions. 
Taken together, the extant literature highlights the importance of IT integration in acquisitions. In this 
paper, we add to that literature, examining IT integration in the acquisition of a business unit by a multi-
business organization. These organizations need to align business and IT strategies at both corporate and 
SBU levels (Reynolds et al. 2010). Therefore, post-acquisition IT integration needs to be established at 
both the corporate and SBU levels. 
We begin by describing our use of Reynolds et al.‟s (2010) model of alignment. This model has been used 
to explain the divestment of SBUs from the vendor‟s perception (Böhm et al. 2010; Fähling et al. 2010; 
Fähling et al. 2009). However, it has not been applied to the challenge of IT integration from the 
acquirer‟s perception. The model is then extended to explain post-acquisition IT integration.  
Alignment in multi-business organizations 
Multi-business organizations, the dominant form for large organizations, involve multiple SBUs, each of 
which competes in its own market. Also referred to as multi-divisional or M-Form organizations, superior 
performance in these organizations is achieved by establishing a number of semi-independent SBUs that 
allow the organizations to grow and diversify (Chandler 1962; Williamson 1975). In these organizations, 
strategies are formed at both the corporate and business unit levels (Grant 2002). Corporate strategy 
specifies how to compete as an organization. This includes the choice of markets in which to compete, the 
level of sharing of resources across the organization by the SBUs, and the acquisition and divestiture of 
business units. Strategies at the SBU level specify how to compete in each of those markets.  
Managing multi-business organizations requires that their corporate strategies generate and capture 
synergies by sharing resources across the SBUs. Given that SBU‟s, by structural arrangement and 
responsibility reasons, not always have the incitement to share resources beyond the unit, synergy 
creation is not always a natural process (Gupta and Govindarajan 1986; Gupta and Seshadri 1994). 
However, without the resource sharing, corporate performance would be simply the sum of the individual 
SBU performances (Dosi et al. 1992; Teece and Pisano 1994). The extant models of business and IT 
alignment (See, for example, Henderson and Venkatraman 1993) do not distinguish between corporate 
and SBU business strategies to align these business strategies with the relevant IT strategies. Instead, they 
align business and IT strategies either at the corporate level or within a single SBU. 
Reynolds et al. (2010) extend those models to include the differences between corporate and SBU level 
business strategies, and their integration with IT strategies at the corporate and SBU levels. The result is a 
two-dimensional framework presented in Figure 1, identifying four alignment components (Corporate 
strategy, SBU strategy, Corporate IT platform, and SBU IT application portfolios) along the two 
dimensions of functional (Business vs. IT) and organizational (Corporate vs. SBU level) alignment. 
The Reynolds et al. (2010) model draws on the resource based-view of strategy (See, for example, Peteraf 
1993).Value is created by building IT-based capabilities that complement business capabilities at both the 
corporate and SBU levels. As shown in Figure 1, organizational alignment requires complementarity 
between business and IT capabilities at the corporate and SBU levels, coherence between the corporate 
and SBU strategies, and fit between the IT platform and individual SBU IT portfolio capabilities, while 
maximizing the independence across SBU IT capabilities. The IT platform capabilities support corporate 
business strategies and SBU IT portfolios capabilities, and the SBU IT portfolio capabilities support their 
corresponding SBU business strategies and leverage the IT platform capabilities. 
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Integrating an acquisition  
M&As are activities in which the business resources and capabilities of two organizations are integrated 
(Sudarsanam 2003). Value is created by the sharing and transfer of complementary resources and 
capabilities between the two organizations (Capron et al. 1998). Drawing on Reynolds et al. (2010), it is 
assumed here that, to maximize the value of acquisitions, the merged business and IT based capabilities 
should exhibit high alignment at both corporate and SBU levels. Conversely, acquisitions that result in 
low alignment destroy or, at least, do not capture the potential value contingent on successful acquisitions 
(c.f. Johnston and Yetton, 1997; Mehta and Hirschheim, 2007). 
Here, we apply Reynolds et al.‟s model (See Figure 1) to identify the initial conditions that influence the 
complexity of the post-acquisition IT integration. Acquisitions in which acquirers can build on and extend 
existing capabilities, called path-dependent acquisitions, are less complex and less challenging than 
acquisitions in which acquirers must develop new capabilities to realize the expected benefits(Capron et 
al. 1998). The latter, path-breaking acquisitions, occur when acquisitions are used by acquirers to re-
invent their business strategies using the acquisitions‟ capabilities. This type of acquisition is more 
explorative and more uncertain than path-dependent acquisitions (Karim and Mitchell 2000).  
 Proposition 1: Post-acquisition IT integration complexity, defined in terms of the need to build new 
business and/or IT capabilities post-acquisition, is a function of the initial conditions. 
Drawing on the model in Figure 1, the acquisition‟s IT capabilities are partitioned into two components. 
One is its infrastructure that can be integrated into or replaced by the acquirer‟s IT platform. The other is 
the acquired business unit‟s IT applications portfolio.  
Then, four pre-acquisition conditions, identified below as a function of four sub-propositions, influence 
the complexity of post-acquisition IT integration. This analysis is similar in form to the analysis by 
Fähling et al. (2009, 2010) and Böhm et al. (2010) of the IT carve-out of an SBU that is sold by a multi-
business organization. Also drawing on Reynolds et al. (2010), Fähling et al. and Böhm et al. show how 
carve-out project complexity is a function of the initial conditions. 
First, drawing on the resource-based theory, a change in business strategy at the corporate level requires 
the development of new business capabilities to support the new strategy. In addition, this change in 
corporate strategy would require the development of new IT platform capabilities. Until these new 
capabilities were developed, business and IT alignment would not be high and performance would suffer. 
 
Figure 1. IT Alignment in Multi-business Organizations (Reynolds et al., 2010)  
Corporate Strategy IT Platform Strategy
SBU Business StrategySBU Business StrategySBU Business Strategy
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Formally, 
 Proposition 1a: The complexity of the post-acquisition IT integration is a function of the change, pre- to 
post-acquisition, in the acquirer‟s corporate strategy. 
Second, the acquirer‟s pre-acquisition IT platform supports its corporate strategy and SBU IT applications 
portfolios. The authors have been unable to identify or imagine an example in which the acquirer is in low 
alignment pre-acquisition and, subsequently, post-acquisition, the acquisition results in high business 
and IT alignment without a change in the acquirer‟s corporate strategy. Of course, the converse does 
occur. Formally, 
 Proposition 1b: The complexity of post-acquisition IT integration is a function of the acquirer‟s pre-
acquisition level of alignment. 
Third, in the case of a simple scope strategy, the acquisition is established as an independent SBU in the 
acquirer, retaining the acquisition‟s own unique IT application portfolio that is supported by the 
acquirer‟s corporate IT platform. In the case of a simple scale strategy, the acquisition is integrated into 
the acquirer‟s relevant SBU, without changing that SBU‟s strategy or IT applications portfolio.  
Simple scope and scale strategies are less complex than acquisitions in which acquirers have to develop 
new business capabilities. The latter occur in path-breaking acquisitions. These are more explorative than 
exploitative and, therefore, more complex (Capron et al. 1998; Karim and Mitchell 2000). Formally, 
 Proposition 1c: The complexity of post-acquisition IT integration is a function of the degree to which the 
acquisition is a simple scope- or scale-based strategy.  
Fourth, extending the acquirer‟s IT platform to support an acquisition‟s IT application portfolio incurs 
high direct IT-based costs, designing, building and testing the new IT platform capabilities, and 
significant indirect ones, due to the elapsed time required to develop the new IT capabilities before 
realizing the IT-based benefits from the acquisition. Formally, 
 Proposition 1d: The complexity of post-acquisition IT integration is a function of the need to build new 
corporate IT platform capabilities to support the acquisition‟s IT applications portfolio.   
Differences in the complexity of post-acquisition IT integration can be treated as continua. In the real 
world, with changing business requirements and continuous innovations in IT, there is always some 
potential for misalignment emerging between business and IT strategies. Here, we are interested in the 
extent that the acquirer needs to develop additional business and/or IT capabilities to preserve or create 
high post-acquisition IT integration.  
When the complexity of post-acquisition IT integration, as specified by Propositions 1a – 1d, is low, the 
integration of the acquired business unit into the acquirer‟s organization without reducing the latter‟s 
high pre-acquisition business and IT alignment is a simple process. In contrast, when the complexity of 
post-acquisition IT integration is high, the integration is a challenging, multi-step process.  
Methodology 
The intent here is to develop a concrete mid-range theory rather than a grand abstract level theory (See, 
for example, Lee 2010). Based on the exploratory nature of this research, qualitative case analysis was 
judged to be the most appropriate approach (c.f. Mohr 1982; Yin 1994). The case settings support the 
examination of how, given different initial conditions, the integration processes evolve through very 
different states and transformations, and in the key events during those processes (Van de Ven 1992). 
This research is part of a large collaborative program with the international industry group, Trelleborg 
AB. That program is presented in Carlsson et al. (2011) as a socio-technical design science project to build 
actionable knowledge to improve the management of IT integration in M&As. The research project 
followed an iterative cycle of problem identification and refinement, theory formulation, design 
proposition, and design evaluation.  
Representatives from Trelleborg were involved in problem formulation and acted as research advisors to 
conduct “informed basic research with stakeholder advice” (Van de Ven 2007). Initially, existing research 
Page 5 of 18
Organizational Theory, Strategy, and Information Systems 
6 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
on IT integration in M&As was matched to the IT integration challenges faced by Trelleborg to identify 
potential kernels for developing design theory. As a consequence of that initial research, the limited 
existing literature was judged insufficient to serve as the explanatory basis for developing design 
propositions. Therefore, it was decided jointly by the researchers and Trelleborg representatives to extend 
the underpinning explanatory theory before the design process could continue. The specific research 
presented in this paper is part of that detour to develop the explanatory theory (See, for example, Gregor 
2006). 
Case selection  
Early in theory development, cases should be chosen that belong to the categories identified in the theory 
being formulated. Later, the selection of cases is used to challenge the theory (Yin 1994). Here, we 
searched for two cases to illustrate the effects of very different initial conditions on post-acquisition IT 
integration. 
The two cases selected are critical in the following sense. One case shows how high complexity, contingent 
on the initial conditions, requires a multi-step process to deliver high post-acquisition IT integration. The 
other case shows   integration is a simple one step process when the initial complexity is low. Both cases 
were in the same industry and had been undertaken by the Trelleborg Engineered Systems division in the 
industry group Trelleborg AB. This controls for some factors that, otherwise, might explain case 
differences.   
In agreement with representatives from Trelleborg, two cases that met the above contrasting initial 
conditions were selected. Both cases were in the same industry and had been undertaken by the 
Trelleborg Engineered Systems division. This controls for some factors that, otherwise, might explain case 
differences. 
Trelleborg Engineered Systems 
Trelleborg Engineered Systems (TES) is a division in the industry group Trelleborg AB, which is a global 
industry group with businesses based on processed polymer materials. The group had by 2004 22,000 
employees spread over more than 40 countries. Annual sales are approximately €3 billion. TES has about 
5,000 employees spread over 30 countries. Its head office is co-located with Trelleborg AB in the small 
city of Trelleborg, in the south of Sweden. TES describes itself as “a leading global supplier of engineered 
solutions that focuses on the sealing, protection and safety of investments, processes and people in 
demanding environments” (Trelleborg 2010). 
TES was committed to an 8–10% annual sales growth target over the business cycle. This has been 
achieved through a combination of organic growth and acquisitions of complementary businesses. Table 1 
describes the two acquisitions. 
Table 1.  Two acquisitions by TES 
Year Unit Price (€) Seller Business Unit sales (€) Unit employees 
1996 CMP/Kléber 40 M Michelin (FR) Industrial hose 60 M pa 750 
2004 Dynaflex 15 M Manuli (IT) Specialty hose 15 M pa 50 
 
Whereas the alignment model by Reynolds et al. (2010) have two levels of analysis (corporate and SBU), 
the Trelleborg Group is organized into three levels: corporate, division, and SBU. For analytical simplicity, 
the Trelleborg Group and TES Division levels of Trelleborg AB are treated as part of the corporate level of 
analysis for acquisitions to be managed by TES. Each division of Trelleborg AB has its own distinct 
corporate culture, way of doing business, unique customer set, and specific IT systems.  
TES corporate strategy and IT platform  
TES develops, manufactures, markets and distributes industrial fluid systems and engineered solutions 
based on polymer materials. These products are technically advanced and are designed for demanding 
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environments found in industries such as the oil and gas industries. TES has centralized IT decisions 
relating to network capacity, purchase of hardware, IT consulting services, and IT outsourcing. Research 
and development has limited corporate IT support. Internal and external communication is supported by 
the corporate website and intranet. Email is a shared Trelleborg Group service 
If an SBU within TES runs its own IT systems for purchase and finance, the SBU must integrate them into 
the central system. IT support for sales is also an SBU responsibility. According to its CIO, TES did not 
believe that there was any single best ERP system for the Division. Therefore, its SBUs were given a high 
degree of autonomy to adopt the system most appropriate for their customers and work processes.  
Data collection 
Table 2 describes the data collected. In addition, interactions between the researchers and Trelleborg 
management occurred over a period of four years, including general discussions about the problems of 
managing M&As and annual research reports to Trelleborg.  
Interviews were the primary method of data collection. Initial interviews were based on a broad 
framework, including the management, strategy, organizational learning and IT integration literatures, to 
identify relevant initial conditions, states, events and transformations in the IT integration process. 
Business and IT strategic alignment was part of this framework because of its generally recognized 
importance for leveraging business benefits in acquisitions (Johnston and Yetton 1996; Mehta and 
Hirschheim 2007; Wijnhoven et al. 2006).  
Table 2. Data collection 
Case Interviewees Additional empirical sources  
General CIO (2 times). Head of Business 
Development, Senior analyst 
Business Development (2) 
Annual feedback sessions (4), annual and periodic 
reports, visits to headquarters, group discussions. 
Kléber  CIO TES (2), Operations 
manager (3), Sales manager, 
Plant manager, IT manager, IT 
developer  
Plant visit, warehouse visit, logistics center visit, project 
plans, internal communication, financial reports, 
investment requests, system architecture blueprints, 
systems documentation, IT infrastructure chart, user 
guides.  
Dynaflex  CIO TES (2), Operations 
manager (2), IT architect (2), 
System integrator (2) 
Plant visit, warehouse visit, project plans, internal 
communication, architecture blueprints, systems 
documentation, IT infrastructure chart, user guides  
Total 13 interviewees, 22 interviews - 
 
Interviewees were selected based on their ability to provide information on how managerial, strategic and 
IT factors interacted in business and IT integration. When selecting the two cases, it was ensured that the 
key people involved in the Kléber acquisition were still working for the Trelleborg Group and were 
available for interviews. The subjects included both line and IT executives at senior and middle level 
management.  
Interviews were wide-ranging and conversational to facilitate the collection of information to contribute 
to both theory development and future data collection. They were recorded and transcribed. Initial coding 
was made using a comprehensive framework of coding categories based on the management, strategy, 
organizational learning, and IT integration literatures. Later, parts of the material were re-coded with 
additional categories representing the constructs of the Reynolds et al. (2010) alignment model in Figure 
1 and the four initial conditions developed in this paper [See Appendix A for the coding protocols based 
on Saldaña (2009) and Guest and MacQueen (2008)]. 
Following the protocols in Appendix A, the three researchers involved in the coding process coded as 
group. This increased coding reliability and created a shared understanding of the data. Additional data 
sources, including documentation (project plans, meeting protocols, presentations to group management, 
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internal correspondence, etc.) and observation, were used to complement the interviews and to 
triangulate research findings. Sensitive documents, including, for example, due diligence reports, internal 
evaluations and other strategic documents, were studied at TES and Trelleborg‟s premises. 
Data analysis commenced immediately after the first round of interviews were completed and continued 
iteratively throughout the research project. This analysis followed the congruence method of George and 
Bennet (2004) in which the process of theoretical generalization begins with a theory and then 
investigates the ability of the theory to explain an outcome in a specific case. Early interim-analyses 
focused on the applicability of analytical concepts. Subsequent analyses developed rich case studies 
supported by quotes and document references to ensure empirical support for the emerging stories. The 
rich cases were shared with Trelleborg employees to get feedback representativeness of findings. Finally, 
the „essence‟ of the cases was condensed into the case stories that are presented in this article. 
The theory in practice 
The processes to deliver high post-acquisition IT integration in the two acquisitions described here were 
very different, contingent on their initial conditions. It took ten years to integrate Kléber into TES. In 
contrast, it took three months to integrate Dynaflex.  
The analysis begins with brief descriptions of the two cases. Drawing on Reynolds et al. (2010), models 
are developed of the different paths to IT integration in each case. A comparison of the models shows how 
the complexity of the paths is contingent on the initial conditions.  
The Kléber case 
Kléber was an acquisition by TES to build a scale-based, low cost business in the hose industry. Two 
factors made Kléber an attractive acquisition. One was the match between the product lines of the existing 
TES unit and Kléber. TES expected to capture economies of scale in production, sales and distribution. 
The other factor was that Kléber was underdeveloped, and presented a potential growth option for the 
Trelleborg Group. To realize these benefits, the existing TES niche hose business and Kléber were 
combined to form a new SBU called Trelleborg Industrial Hose (TIH). 
“In terms of production, the two units… ... were very compatible…… Overlapping was also limited in 
geographical terms. Trelleborg was more Nordic, more niche. Kléber was more Continental, had a larger 
product range, and had a wider distribution network. Basically, the companies competed in the same market 
only in Germany. … … Kléber had strong market shares in some key countries. … … Kléber was not 
profitable due to lack of management support and investment. Michelin did not realize the potential of Kléber’s 
market position.” (TIH CFO). 
 
Before making the substantial investments required to develop this growth option, the Trelleborg Group 
wanted control and insight into the operation of the new TIH business. To achieve that, TES took one 
immediate action and planned a second. The former, to gain control, was to appoint a Swedish 
management team and to replace the French suppliers to Kléber with the Swedish suppliers to the pre-
acquisition TES hose business. The latter planned action, to gain insight, was to port the Kléber IT 
systems, based on the in-house developed ERP system Bergounix, onto the Movex platform used by TES.  
Two years after the acquisition, the Swedish team had failed to deliver on both strategies. It had not 
developed the business and IT capabilities to run a scale-based, low cost hose business. The Swedish team 
had also failed to port the Kléber systems onto the Movex platform used by TES. The platform was highly 
customized to meet the specific local requirements in TES‟s multi-national business structure. Its 
redeployment to support TIH would have required further extensive customization. The cost was 
unacceptable and the proposed action was cancelled.  
“At the end of 1998, they came to the conclusion that it would take about 1000 working days to develop the 
new Movex system to support the Kléber development and integration … … It was too much. It couldn’t be 
justified with future savings.“ (TIH operations manager). 
 
The Swedish team was replaced by a French management team. TIH was restructured to capture scale 
advantages. Production was moved from Trelleborg to the former Kléber site to capture production-based 
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economies of scale, and TIH was restructured. Single functional heads were appointed in a centralized 
cost focused structure, and IT was standardized and centralized on the Kléber Bergounix IT platform to 
reduce distribution and IT operating costs. Later, the Bergounix IT platform, which was expensive to 
maintain and extend, was replaced by a standard Movex-based system. Finally, the IT strategy was 
aligned with the new scale-based low cost business strategy. New business and IT capabilities had been 
developed. Costs were reduced and TIH became profitable.  
“We redrew the organizational chart completely… … But in 2001 we had real problems with the infrastructure 
and IT. The Bergounix system was 10 years old. It was hard to support and didn’t fit with other systems in 
TES. When we tried to add modules, it was complex and expensive… … We decided to buy a prestudy, 
comparing Movex to the other standard packages available… … The idea was to check if Movex was 
competitive with the others… … The ERP system itself was not what was interesting for us, that was the 
basics. It should just support our business at a low cost. What we were interested in was, for example, the 
supply-chain module that we are implementing right now. But that we couldn’t have done without first putting 
the whole business unit into the same Movex application.” (TIH operations manager)  
 
“Since 1999 we have improved every year. In 1999, three years after the acquisition, we lost €3 million. The 
ROA [Return On Assets] was negative, while for the Trelleborg Group the standard was 15%. We have 
improved every year since then and last year we had a ROA of 17%. The profit was more than €7 million. 
Turnover was €100 million. It’s a good improvement, and a good result… … This year [2006] the ROA will 
increase to 21% or 22 %” (TIH operations manager). 
 
Table 3 presents the initial conditions of the Kléber acquisition. Pre-acquisition, the acquirer‟s niche 
strategy was inconsistent with its post-acquisition low cost, growth strategy; the acquirer‟s hose business 
was not aligned with the Trelleborg/TES strategy of focusing on core businesses; Kléber was a business 
transforming acquisition and not a simple scale-based strategy; and the Kléber IT application portfolio 
could not be integrated with the existing ERP system of the TES hose business. In this context, each of the 
four propositions, Propositions 1a-1d,predicts high post-acquisition IT integration complexity. 
 
Figure 2 presents the three-step post-acquisition IT integration process. Grey areas indicate new, 
developed capabilities. Effectively, after its acquisition, Kléber was an independent organization, 
decoupled from the Michelin Group. After exploring a number of ineffective options, TIH developed a new 
growth strategy. Based on the pre-acquisition Kléber unit, a new IT strategy to support the low-cost scale 
strategy was implemented. Finally, the original TES hose unit was integrated into the TIH business and its 
IT application portfolio was ported onto the new Movex platform that had been developed for the Kléber 
acquisition.  
Table 3. The initial conditions and post-acquisition complexity in the Kléber acquisition 
Initial conditions Level of post-acquisition IT integration complexity 
1:  There was a major change, pre- to post-
acquisition, in the acquirer‟s corporate 
strategy. 
High: The acquisition was made to transform the 
business strategy for the TES hose business, replacing 
its niche strategy with a low cost, scale-based growth 
strategy. 
2: Pre-acquisition, the acquirer is in low 
alignment. 
High: TES produced standard hose products, 
supported by high cost customized ERP and 
production systems. 
3: The acquisition is not a simple scope or scale 
strategy. 
High: Kléber was a business transformational 
acquisition. 
4: New corporate IT platform capabilities are 
required to support both the acquisition‟s IT 
applications portfolio and the new low cost 
growth strategy. 
High: The cost of developing the existing TES hose 
ERP system to support Kléber‟s IT application 
portfolio was very high and could not be justified. 
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Figure 2. Transformation and integration of the Kléber acquisition. 
The Dynaflex case 
In March 2004, TES made a second acquisition in the hose industry, acquiring the niche-player Dynaflex 
from Manuli, an Italian industry group. At that time, TES‟s hose business, TIH was highly profitable with 
a low cost position in the market for industrial hose. While both TIH and Dynaflex had production 
operations located in France, their core customers and products were independent.  
“Within the hose business, there are two different markets. Hydraulic hoses are for high pressure application 
and composite hoses are for low and medium pressure. Dynaflex had focused on the former and TIH on the 
latter… Before the deal was done, TIH had purchased a limited range of products from Dynaflex. After the 
acquisition, they became major distributors of each other’s products. They did not manufacture competing 
products. “  (TIH Systems integrator). 
 
TIH manufactured and serviced a wide range of hose products. Dynaflex specialized in the production of 
hydraulic hoses for the oil and petro-chemical industries, and enjoyed a reputation for technological 
leadership. Therefore, the acquisition of Dynaflex was a simple scope-based, related product acquisition. 
TIH enhanced its product palette, becoming a distributor of Dynaflex products. The strategic intent was to 
grow the Dynaflex product line, for example, by launching its products in new markets where TIH already 
had a strong market position.  
“The Trelleborg group does not acquire a company that is already successful. Rather, it prefers to see future 
potential and either develop the company or introduce its products to new countries. For example, in this case, 
we launched Dynaflex products in the U.K., where Dynaflex previously had not had any customers.”  (TIH 
Operations manager) 
 
The initial conditions for the Dynaflex acquisition were very different from those for the Kléber  
acquisition (See Table 4). The acquirer‟s pre-acquisition strategy of growth was consistent with the scope-
based acquisition of Dynaflex. Pre-acquisition, TIH was in high alignment based on the model in Figure 1. 
Dynaflex was a simple scope-based acquisition and its infrastructure was replaced by the acquirer‟s IT 
platform. Each of the four Propositions, 1a – 1d, predicts low post-acquisition complexity and a simple 
one step IT integration path. 
“We didn’t really need to program that much. We used existing processes that we had created for previous 
projects. I think that we only created one or two new processes. For the rest, we could either reuse what we had 
or use Movex standard processes. We needed to investigate the databases and move the items to Movex. ... … 
Databases are where you normally spend the most time. You have to go through which products, customers, etc 
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1996: Acqusition setup as change 2001: New TIH business strategy 2003: IT application portfolio 2005: TES/TIH can leverage both
in TES corporate strategy for its in place in the former Kléber unit supporting new low cost strategy scope and scale advantages
hose business in place in former Kléber unit
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Dynaflex‟s IT production system was retained as an independent IT system, while sales and distribution 
IT were ported onto TIH‟s new Movex-based ERP system. This had recently replaced the Bergounix-based 
application portfolio at TIH. The capabilities developed during that replacement helped TIH to manage 
the Dynaflex integration. Furthermore, with its financial systems integrated with the TES platform, 
Dynaflex also became integrated into the general Trelleborg IT platform for financial control and 
monitoring. Full business and IT integration was achieved quickly and successfully, given the initial 
conditions. 
Figure 3 shows the one step process followed to integrate Dynaflex with TES. This was consistent with the 
TES growth by acquisition strategy and did not require the development of new business or IT 
capabilities. Links 1 and 2 in Figure 3 satisfy the coherence condition in Figure 1. The Dynaflex business 
and IT capabilities were retained and, therefore, link 3 in Figure 3 remained in fit. Finally, the Dynaflex 
restricted, production-based application portfolio was independent of other SBU IT portfolios. 
Consequently link 4 satisfies the independence condition in Figure 1. 
 
 
Cross case analysis 
Consider the Kléber and Dynaflex cases in terms of the effects on their post-acquisition IT integration of 
the different initial conditions (See Tables 3 and 4). Kléber was an acquisition to reposition an existing 
SBU, changing its niche strategy to a low cost, scale-based growth strategy, based on delivering a 
standardized product into different geographical markets. In contrast, the Dynaflex acquisition positioned 
TIH to capture the benefits of scope in a product segment it did not service in geographical markets that it 
already serviced. 
Table 4. The initial conditions and post-acquisition complexity in the Dynaflex acquisition 
Initial condition  Level of post-acquisition IT integration complexity 
1:  There was no change, pre- to post-
acquisition, in the acquirer‟s corporate 
strategy. 
Low: The acquirer‟s pre-acquisition corporate growth 
strategy was consistent with its post-acquisition 
strategy. 
2: Pre-acquisition, the acquirer is in high 
alignment. 
Low: Having fully integrated the Kléber acquisition, 
TIH was in high alignment. 
3: The acquisition is a simple scope strategy. Low: No new business or IT apabilities needed to be 
developed. 
4: The TIH Movex platform can support the 
Dynaflex application systems. 
Low: The Dynaflex IT infrastructure was replaced by 
the TIH Movex platform with minor development to 
that platform. No new IT capabilities were needed. 
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The Kléber acquisition involved a complex set of post-acquisition IT integration decisions. Pre-
acquisition, the acquirer, TES, operated a niche-based SBU strategy and wanted to either divest or grow 
that SBU. A larger competitor SBU was offered for sale and acquired. The strategic intent was to capture 
the potential economies of scale.  
The initial conditions of the acquisition predict a complex post-acquisition integration process. The 
acquisition changed TES‟s existing SBU‟s pre-acquisition strategy from a niche to a scale-based strategy. 
This required the development of both new business and IT capabilities.  
Post-acquisition, the consolidated SBU, TIH, had to build the capabilities to transform a niche strategy 
into a scale-based strategy. In addition, the acquirer‟s IT platform could not support Kléber‟s IT 
application portfolio. Initially, post-acquisition IT alignment at both the corporate and SBU levels was 
low. This limited TIH‟s ability to both implement the growth strategy and realize other potential IT-based 
benefits from the acquisition. This case also raises the question of the order in which to address the 
factors that contribute to the high post-acquisition IT integration complexity.  
In the Dynaflex acquisition, the four initial conditions predict a simple post-acquisition IT integration 
process. Under those conditions, the acquisition was integrated into the acquirer by establishing the 
acquisition as a new product line in TIH. No new business or IT capabilities needed to be developed. Post-
acquisition IT integration was high, realizing the expected benefits from the acquisition. Table 5 depicts 
the different needs for capability development in the two acquisitions.  
Table 5. Business and IT capability development  




Develop: Existing strategy for the hose 
business had proven unsuccessful in both 
TES and Kléber. A new scale-based, low-
cost strategy was developed utilizing the 
combined capacity. 
Use: Pre-acquisition both TIH and Dynaflex 
were performing well. It was decided to keep 





Use: Having been a divestment candidate 
for a long time, Kléber was effectively a 
stand-alone business that could be 
sustained independently. It was slowly 
moved over to the TES platform. 
Use: Dynaflex was kept as a separate product 
line, using the TES infrastructure to replace 





Develop: With its starting point in the 
former Kléber unit, a new SBU business 
strategy, implementing the scale-based 
corporate strategy, was developed. 
Use: Dynaflex was maintained as an 
independent product line, retaining its 




Develop: The new scale-based, low-cost 
strategy was not supported by the highly 
specialized applications portfolio. 
Use: Dynaflex retained its pre-acquisition 
production applications portfolio, leveraging 
existing Movex modules from TIH for other IT 
applications. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This section begins by reviewing the above findings and critically assessing Proposition 1. The limitations 
of and validity threats to the findings are then discussed. Finally, the implications for theory and practice 
are explored. 
Kléber was a business transforming, path-breaking acquisition, requiring the development of new 
business and IT capabilities at both the SBU and corporate levels. Its integration path was long and 
complex. In contrast, the Dynaflex acquisition strategy was based on realizing the potential benefits of 
increased scope. It positioned TIH in a growth segment of the industry and leveraged TIH's distribution 
system. No new business or IT capabilities had to be developed.  
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As Proposition 1 states, differences in the need for capability development between the two cases is a 
function of differences in the initial business and IT conditions. Tables 3, 4 and 5 report the initial 
conditions and post-acquisition IT integration in the two acquisitions. In the Kléber acquisition, the pre-
acquisition business and IT capabilities within the TES hose business and Kléber could not be integrated 
initially within TIH to achieve high post-acquisition IT integration. In contrast, in the Dynaflex case, the 
initial conditions enabled Dynaflex to be “plugged” into TIH without reducing the high business and IT 
strategic alignment of either TIH or Dynaflex.  
The IT challenges contingent on the acquisition of Kléber are reported in Tables 3 and 5. These became 
highly salient to the TIH management when the new French management team reviewed the cost of 
extending the existing hose business‟s IT systems to support the acquired unit. The cost was prohibitive. 
Instead, a new SBU application strategy was developed. With the Kléber unit being four times larger than 
the original TES hose unit, the new scale-based SBU IT strategy was developed based on the pre-
acquisition Kléber business in Clermont-Ferrand. 
Limitations and validity threats 
The major limitation of this analysis is its restriction to the acquisition of a business unit by a multi-
business organization. It does not include the acquisition of a multi-business organization by another 
multi-business organization, or the merger between two such organizations. Both are much more complex 
events than the acquisition of a business unit that is analyzed in this exploratory research study.  
In this paper we have limited the analysis to the consequences of initial conditions of business and IT-
alignment conditions and the influence on IT integration complexity. We are by no means suggesting that 
the alignment conditions are the only contingencies influencing post-acquisition IT integration. Obviously 
factors such as time pressure exacerbating the IT integration process, the sheer size of the units to 
integrate, scale and scope of databases, and the reliance on IT for critical business operations are also part 
of the IT integration challenge. However, in this article we have described that the post-alignment 
conditions also constitute an important explanation to the IT integration challenge. Subsequent research 
should investigate the weight of contributing explanations and under which circumstances the different 
sources are interacting to accelerate or alleviate IT integration challenges.  
The major validity threat to the findings reported is whether the relative sizes of the acquisitions could 
explain the differences between the two acquisitions. Dynaflex had sales of €15m pa and employed 50 
people. Kléber had sales of €60m pa and employed 750 people. Against an explanation based on scale, 
both acquisitions were small compared with the size of both Trelleborg and TES. The former had sales of 
€3b pa and 22,000 employees, and the latter had sales of €500m pa and 5000 employees when 
completing the Dynaflex acquisition in 2004. In addition, Dynaflex and Kléber were similar in that they 
were single line of business units. Size may have played a minor role in differences in post-acquisition IT 
integration and should be investigated in subsequent research. However, it is difficult to see how size 
accounts for the specific events in the Kléber integration over ten years. 
Implications for theory  
This paper makes four theoretical contributions to the area of post-acquisition IT integration. First, it 
explains how the complexity of post-acquisition IT integration is a function of four initial conditions. 
Second, the analysis shows how the alignment model of Reynolds et al. (2010) can be extended to explain 
post-acquisition IT integration as a special case of IT (re-)alignment. Third, the research begins to identify 
the initial conditions, and business and IT capabilities required to successfully manage post-acquisition IT 
integration. Fourth, the analysis begins to develop a theory of post-acquisition IT integration. 
First, the four initial conditions specify the context in which post-acquisition IT integration is a one-step 
process. The acquirer assimilates the target using existing capabilities. Consistent with this, Capron et al. 
(1998) report that exploitative acquisitions can be implemented without the exploratory process of 
building new capabilities. In addition, (Karim and Mitchell 2000) report that exploitative, compared to 
exploratory, acquisitions are more successful in creating financial value. The four initial conditions also 
specify the context in which post-acquisition IT integration is a complex, multi-step process.  
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Adopting a critical case approach, we investigated one acquisition that the initial conditions predicted 
would be a simple post-acquisition process and one predicted to be complex. Future research should 
investigate different combinations of initial conditions. An important question to be addressed is: Does 
the complexity of post-acquisition IT integration increase linearly or exponentially with increasingly 
challenging initial conditions?  
Developing capabilities requires time. Mehta and Hirschheim (2007) recognize that many IT integration 
decisions are taken under significant time pressure to realize the expected acquisition benefits, including 
the IT-based benefits. Time pressures would not be a problem in the Dynaflex case. However, in the 
Kléber case, there would have been significant blowouts to the time and cost of the initial integration plan. 
Establishing an appropriate and feasible timeline for integration is critical. 
Second, integrating existing research on redeployment of capabilities in acquisitions with the strategic 
alignment model of Reynolds et al. (2010) explains why some acquisitions are more challenging than 
others and require more effort to integrate IT post-acquisition. The findings confirm the importance of 
distinguishing between acquisitions that exploit existing capabilities, and those that require the 
exploration of new business and/or IT capabilities to achieve IT integration.  
Third, this analysis indirectly suggests that there are two different types of initial conditions. One set, the 
set researched here, describes the acquisition in terms of how exploitative versus explorative it is. The 
other type describes the acquirer‟s capabilities to manage IT integration. The former asks: How high is the 
bar? The latter asks: How high can the organization jump?  
Organizational ability to manage IT integration is positively correlated with the financial performance of 
M&As (Tanriverdi and Uysal 2011). The Dynaflex case shows how the capabilities, developed by TIH to 
implement the Movex roll out, facilitated the integration of Dynaflex into TIH and TES. Future research 
on post-acquisition IT integration should model both the initial conditions, concerning the complexity of 
the integration in terms of the development of new business and IT capabilities, and the acquirer‟s 
existing capabilities to develop those new capabilities. For example, a multi-business organization, with 
no prior experience in integrating IT post-acquisition, would need to develop both types of capabilities to 
manage a transformational acquisition. This would be a major challenge over an extended period. 
Fourth, drawing on Proposition 1 and the above analysis, we begin to develop a theory of post-acquisition 
IT integration to be used as the foundation for developing design theory propositions for successful post-
acquisition IT integration. In terms of design theory components (See Gregor and Jones 2007), we refine 
the definitions of purpose and scope, showing that successful acquisitions of business units by multi-
business organizations require IT strategic integration at both the corporate and SBU levels. We also 
define four new theory constructs. These are the initial conditions of business and IT strategic alignment 
at corporate and SBU levels. Identifying the initial conditions and exploring the various paths to deliver 
high post-acquisition IT integration contributes to the development of principles governing form and 
function. 
Figure 4 maps where our contribution is located in relation to existing knowledge about IT integration in 
M&As. This location is highlighted in bold. IT integration success is the combined outcome of the initial 
conditions and the acquirer‟s capabilities to integrate an acquisition. 
We identify two different levels of IT integration challenge, contingent on the initial conditions. One is the 
exploitative use of existing IT capabilities. The other is the explorative development of new IT capabilities 
that support a business strategy combining the strengths of both acquirer and acquired units. In the 
Dynaflex case, a potential exploitative capability contributed towards a successful, low resource 
integration project. Drawing on their experience of moving the Kléber systems onto the Movex platform, 
the integration team quickly and successfully integrated Dynaflex into TIH.  
In the Kléber case, management initially, at the time of the acquisition, struggled with the challenge of 
explorative-based development. A critical additional resource was the new operations manager, who had 
recently implemented a low cost IT structure at his previous organization. He brought knowledge and 
practices to develop the IT explorative-based capabilities required by TIH. The next step in theory 
development would include an analysis of the interaction between organizational IT integration 
capabilities and the nature of the specific IT integration challenge.  
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Implications for practice 
The Kléber case illustrates the problems that are frequently described in the media when explaining the 
failures in managing acquisitions. In contrast, the Dynaflex case demonstrates why those problems are 
not always present. Taken together, the cases show how differences in post-acquisition IT integration 
processes are a function of differences in the initial conditions. This analysis has five implications for 
successful practice 
First, the findings presented above enable practitioners to better understand the link between post-
acquisition IT integration and value creation in acquisitions. For organizations involved in acquisitions, 
understanding the importance of the initial conditions provides help in two areas. One is that it identifies 
those SBUs that would be either easy or difficult for the potential acquirer to integrate. Rather than accept 
the high integration cost of business unit acquisitions whose initial conditions are similar to Kléber, 
acquirer‟s should, whenever possible, find other easier and lower integration cost targets. 
Second, this paper identifies some of the challenges to be overcome when a potentially challenging 
acquisition is acquired. The four initial conditions identify the new business and/or IT capabilities that 
need to be developed. These initial conditions also help plan the sequence of changes and to identify the 
appropriate time line. 
Third, best practice in post-acquisition IT integration for multi-business organizations benefits from 
recognizing that IT integration is a multi-level process. The IT integration with business on both corporate 
and SBU levels typically implies, as was the case in the Kléber acquisition, deconstructing a single level IT 
infrastructure. This makes the acquirer‟s IT architecture a potential major factor in a successful 
integration strategy. 
Fourth, the Dynaflex acquisition illustrates that IT integration of an SBU from another multi-business 
organization is frequently subject to severe time pressures. The SBU is supported by its prior owner‟s 
infrastructure for a limited period. Frequently, the integration project contract limits important IT 
support by the vendor‟s IT platform to a maximum of six months. 
Finally, for organizations that adopt a growth by acquisition strategy, the findings presented here, 
combined with the findings reported by Tanriverdi and Uysal (2011), suggest the need to develop specific 
capabilities to manage post-acquisition IT integration. These would be corporate capabilities, for example, 
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Appendix A - Coding  
First phase coding of interviews essentially followed the approach for descriptive coding described by 
Saldan  a (2009). Coding was made by themes in passages. Inspired by Strauss and Corbin (1990) a 
technique similar to systematic categorization was employed, with a priori categories based on previous 
literature (see below). Second phase coding was made by events and states, representing the combination 
of coding categories. Following protocols based on Saldaña (2009) and Guest and MacQueen (2008), the 
three researchers that were involved in the coding process coded as group. Categorization of passages was 
made using constant comparison to passages already coded with the same categorization. Based on event 
series, extensive case stories were written and shared with interviewees for verification. 
Table A. Coding Categories 
Category/Code Classification Indicative references  
A. Synergetic potential 
a1 Technical 
economies 
Marketing, Production, Experience, 
Scheduling, Banking, Compensation 
(Howell 1970; Shepherd 1979) 
a2 Pecuniary 
economies 
Monopoly, Monopsy (Porter 1980; Shepherd 1979) 
a3 Portfolio economies Related, unrelated (Higgens&Schall, 1975; Lewellen, 1971) 
a4 Resource 
redeployment 
R&D, Manufacturing, Marketing, 
Managerial, Financial 
(Capron et al, ) 
a5 Growth path Path-dependent, path-breaking (Karim& Mitchell, 2000) 
B. Organizational Integration 
b1 Interdependency 
type 
Pooled, Sequential, Reciprocal (Thompson 2003) 
b2 Degree of 
Integration 
Holding, Preservation, Symbiosis, 
Absorption 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991) 
b3 Integrated Activity Operational, Functional (Barki and Pinsonneault 2005) 
C. Intentions & Reactions 
c1 Friendliness/ 
Hostility  
Rescue, Collaboration, Combination, 
Takeover 
(Pritchett 1985) 
c2 Reaction Turnover rate, Level of distrust (Buono and Bowditch 1989; Napier 1989) 
D. IS Ecology 
d1 Supported activity Operational, Functional (Barki and Pinsonneault 2005) 
d2 Strategic 
importance 
None, Enabling, Utility, Strategic (Weill and Broadbent 1998) 
E. Integration Architecture 
e1 Integration level IT, Infological, Organizational (business) (Al Mosawi et al. 2006; Iivari 2003) 
e2 Integration 
structure 
P2P, Middleware, Enterprise, Meta-level, 
SOA 
(Davenport 2005; Markus 2000; Zhu 2005) 
F. IS integration role 
f1 Proactivity Proactive improvement, Proactive matching,  
Reactive 
(McKiernan and Merali 1995; Merali and 
McKiernan 1993) 
G. Alignment 
g1 Acquirer pre  High-Low (Dosi et al., 1992, Teece and Pisano, 1994, . 
Reynolds et al., 2010, Ross et al., 2006) g2 Target pre High-Low 
g3 Acquirer post High-Low 
g4 Target post High-Low 
L: Improvements and organizational learning 
l1 Double and single 
loop learning 
Norms and values, detection and correction 
of errors, feedback, reflection, goals, plans, 
rules.   
(Argyris and Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996 
Edmondson and  Moingeon; 1999) 
l2 Exploration and 
Exploitation 
Search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, discovery, innovation, 
refinement, choice, efficiency, selection, 
implementation 
(March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1981; 
Weick and Westly, 1996, Cyert and March, 
1963; Simon, 2001; Weick, 1979) 
l3 Externalization and 
Internalization 
Willingness, Autonomy, Fluctuation (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) 
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